

PolandThe Political-Military ResponsetoSoviet Intervention or Massive Repression

The Alliance is generally agreed that the lack of Western response to an overt Soviet intervention in Poland could seriously shake Western European morale, intimidate third world governments and encourage further Soviet reliance on force as an instrument of policy. It was felt both that the West had to make clear to the Soviets that a price must be paid for their behavior and that the United States retains both the will and the capability to honor its commitments. It was also recognized that the movement of additional Soviet forces into Poland would require improvements in NATO's military posture.

NATO has agreed upon a number of short term military responses in the event of Soviet invasion of Poland. The inter-agency group on Poland has also been examining a number of long term political-military measures which might be taken with or without an overt Soviet intervention. They have not yet been raised with the Allies.

At annex are the short term military measures which the Alliance has agreed to take in the event of a Soviet invasion of Poland. They include activation of a skeleton SHAPE War Headquarters (WHQ), covert actions short of those requiring national agreement and preparations for a NATO formal alert. NATO did not approve an increase in the number of air defense aircraft and missiles on alert, nor implementation of electronic warfare measures.

It is important to note, however, that none of these measures -- with the exception of an immediate increase in the readiness of the Standby Naval Force Atlantic, deployment of AWACS and intensified intelligence gathering -- are applicable in the absence of a Soviet intervention. Also of interest therefore are a number of longer term measures, some of which might be obtainable short of a Soviet intervention, but in response to a rollback of reforms or massive repression in Poland. Two come to mind immediately:

-- Acceleration of the process of ratification of Spanish accession to NATO by national parliaments.

-- Dutch and Belgian acceptance of the current GLCM deployment schedule.

Requests for CW and ERW deployments could also be considered but we see them as so highly contentious that they would be

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starters only in the event of a large scale Soviet intervention.

The measures being considered through the interagency process fall into five general categories: defense spending, manpower, defense improvements, steps vis-a-vis the Allies and out-of-area measures. We will need to establish priorities among and within these categories: how many we will be able to pursue will be determined by the extent of public reaction to a Soviet intervention.

1. Spending for Defense. While the current economic situation in both the U.S. and Europe make significant increases in defense spending unlikely, a Soviet intervention in Poland could provide increased support for implementation of current programs and in the case of the Europeans acceleration of specific programs designed to meet the increased threat. The outright suppression of Solidarity, not to mention a Soviet intervention, will make it important that the U.S. avoid cuts in defense spending and security assistance.

2. Manpower Decisions. The single most significant measure the U.S. could unilaterally take would be the return to some form of conscription, but this could polarize the U.S. and take the focus off Poland. Short of reinstituting conscription we should continue the current registration program and improve the overall readiness of our reserve components.

We would ask that the Allies also take measures in the manpower area that would directly improve the readiness of NATO forces. These might include improved peacetime manning levels, longer periods of conscription (if we institute the draft), higher standards for the training and equipping of current reserve units, formation of additional reserve units and improved national mobilization systems. In this regard, a major NATO exercise as early as possible in the new year involving reserve units principally would have major symbolic value and lead to longer term improvements.

3. General Defense Improvements. In order to secure public support, measures should be directly related to the increased threat caused by a Soviet intervention in Poland.

Emphasis should be placed on those areas already identified for action in the NATO Force Goals, the LTDP and Phase II of the defense response to Afghanistan. While specific measures would be based on recommendations of the major NATO Commanders consideration should be given to measures in the following general areas:

- Accelerated procurement of readiness stocks, particularly PGMs to ammo stocks.

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- Accelerated modernization programs with emphasis on improving anti-armor, air defense, EW and ASW capabilities.
- Acceleration of the NATO Infrastructure Program spending with emphasis on facilities for reinforcements.
- Accelerated implementation of Host Nation Support measures.
- Commitment of additional European civil cargo and long range passenger aircraft for NATO reinforcement purposes, taking into account our SWA needs.
- Increased alliance assistance to Portugal and Turkey.

4. Specific steps with European Nations. In addition to Alliance-wide general defense improvements we considered unilateral measures with selected European nations.

- France. Increased cooperation with France offers a significant opportunity, but this effort would have to be carefully handled through SACEUR channels. Possible measures might include closer coordination of military activities with NATO, increased participation in NATO exercises and French procurement of AWACS aircraft.

- Greece. Events in Poland could make it more difficult for Papandreu to justify to his military withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure and to eliminate U.S. bases. It could also give a rationale for Greece to retain nuclear weapons. We should take advantage of this to mount an effort to check Papandreu's disengagement.

- Turkey. In addition to encouraging increased alliance aid to Portugal the U.S. should consider significantly increasing aid to Turkey.

5. Out-of-Area Measures. An overt Soviet intervention in Poland would also create the opportunity for responses outside of Europe. We could accelerate the Ikle initiatives to press for host nation support and other measures by the Allies to provide assistance for the possible use of U.S. forces in SW Asia. We would also use the Polish opportunity to encourage further support for a U.S. military presence by Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt. Covert and other out-of-area initiatives are being addressed separately.

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### Steps to Gain Allied Support

Finally, the key to developing a coordinated Western response will be an effective plan for gaining the support of our Allies. Timing will be critical. The measures we eventually propose and the timing of our response will to a large extent depend on the nature of the Soviet intervention and the public reaction. In general we foresee the following gameplan:

- When intervention seems probable, we would mention privately to key Allies the need for an eventual long term defense response.

- At the post-intervention Ministerial we would expect initial public reaction to allow for rapid implementation of agreed Allied political and economic measures.

- At the same time we would press for recognition of the requirement of a long term defense response to the new situation.

- We would allow for public indignation to grow before presenting to the Allies our assessment of the military implications of the Soviet action and unveiling actions which we intended to take.

- As European public indignation swelled, we would begin to press for a limited number of long term defense measures, as well as stronger measures in the political and economic field.

- After several months, we would announce collective steps.

Throughout this process we would seek to ensure that Allied governments do not tacitly accept a Soviet intervention and occupation of Poland.

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SUBJECT: A Summary of Discussion with the Allies on Defense Measures Should the Soviets Invade Poland

Short-term Measures Designed to Improve NATO's Military Readiness

The US has participated in NATO's development and implementation of short-term military measures taken in anticipation of a possible Soviet intervention into Poland. During December 1980, NATO took the following actions:

- Maintained the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (a multi-national naval formation) in a high state of readiness.
- Deployed, on SACEUR request, US E3A AWACS aircraft to increase NATO's intelligence and air defense capabilities.
- Intensified intelligence gathering on the situation.

The Defense Ministers, at their December Defense Planning Committee meeting (DPC), also delegated authority to SACEUR to implement the following measures prior to or upon Soviet intervention. (None of these measures have been implemented to date.)

- Activate SHAPE War Headquarters (WHQ) with skeleton manning on a 24-hour basis.
- Man major subordinate commanders' (MSC) situation centers on a 24-hour basis.
- Review contingency plans and test Allied Command Europe (ACE) communications.
- Take below listed covert actions short of declaration of a formal State of Military Vigilance (which takes national agreement) to increase peacetime operational readiness. Although some of these measures are redundant with those above, implementation of them triggers preset chain of national actions.
  - Preparations for communication support (man war communication centers, excluding alternate and emergency centers).
  - Preparation and initial implementation of circuit activities (test wartime communications).

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- Further intensification of collection and reporting of intelligence. (Nations prepare to bring wartime intelligence organization into effect.)
- Operation of WHQ with skeleton staffs (down to division level).
- Preparation of alert plans and check of mobilization plans (discreetly prepare for implementation of any of the stages of the NATO Formal Alert or Counter-Surprise systems; review General Defense and Operations Plan).

The DPC did not approve the following SACEUR-requested measures; largely for the reason that they could not be accomplished covertly and would be seen as provocative, or at least as anticipating conflict, which in either event would cause severe political reactions.

- Double number of air defense aircraft and SAM missiles on alert.
- Implement electronic warfare support measures.

The NATO Military Committee has adopted a matrix of military options to be considered by the political authorities when a Soviet intervention is imminent or occurs. These options include implementing additional Military Vigilance measures and alerting or deploying NATO command forces such as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air).

In addition, the US has initiated the implementation of the following prudent, low-visibility measures to improve the readiness of US Forces in Europe.

- Logistics: Action is ongoing to fill, as possible, the key shortages in Europe as requested by USCINCEUR. Strategic lift resources have been identified.
- Personnel: Services have identified sources to fill key personnel vacancies in Europe.

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Annex

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